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Constructive notions of set
Part I
Sets in Martin–Lo¨f type theory
Laura Crosilla
This is the first of two articles dedicated to the notion of con-
structive set. In them we attempt a comparison between two
different notions of set which occur in the context of the foun-
dations for constructive mathematics. We also put them under
perspective by stressing analogies and differences with the no-
tion of set as codified in the classical theory Zermelo–Fraenkel.
In the current article we illustrate in some detail the notion
of set as expressed in Martin–Lo¨f type theory and present the
essential characters of this theory. In a second article we shall
explore a distinct notion of set, as arising in the context of intu-
itionistic versions of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. The theory
we shall analyse there is Aczel’s CZF (Constructive Zermelo–
Fraenkel) and we shall supplement its exposition by a succinct
account of Aczel’s interpretation of CZF in type theory. This
will enable us to compare the two notions in a more precise
sense.
1. Introduction
Constructive type theory has been founded by Per Martin–Lo¨f
with the philosophical motive of clarifying the syntax and seman-
tics of intuitionistic mathematics([22]). It is a rich and expressive
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theory whose fundamental concept is that of type. An essential part
of type theory is constituted by a theory of sets, intended as specific
kinds of types whose equality and membership can be asserted in
an exhaustive way. A set theory in this sense is the main topic of
the monograph [23].
Aim of this article is a presentation as simple as possible of the
basic ideas of the theory of sets in [23]. We believe that a more
widespread familiarity with type theory will be beneficial to the
discussion on the foundations of mathematics as well as to the un-
derstanding of constructivism. One of the greatest benefits of type
theory, in fact, is that the examination of the logical notions is not
isolated but on the contrary carried out as part of the more general
task of clarifying the foundations of constructive mathematics and
in particular the notion of set. This seems very much in agreement
with Brouwer’s view of a precedence of mathematics over logic. The
logical rules are elegantly obtained from the more general rules for
sets by means of the Curry–Howard correspondence and stand out
for clarity if compared for example with the rather mysterious jus-
tification of the intuitionistic logical operators usually referred to as
BHK–interpretation.
In a second article we shall explore the relationship between
the notion of set in type theory and that underlying a specific in-
tuitionistic version of Zermelo–Fraenkel axiomatic set theory. The
theory we shall analyse there is Aczel’sCZF, Constructive Zermelo–
Fraenkel (see for example [2] and [3]). It is characterised by the
simplicity of its language, which is the same as that of classical
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, of which it is in fact a subsystem.
Hence in developing constructive mathematics, one can make use of
the usual set–theoretic intuitions, the only and essential difference
with classical set theory being the requirement to avoid arguments
of a non–constructive character. The relationship between the two
theories will be clarified by recalling Aczel’s interpretation of CZF
in a corresponding system of Martin–Lo¨f type theory. In view of
the fact that we shall here mainly present the fragment of type the-
ory which relates with sets, we shall distinguish between these two
notions of set by referring to Martin–Lo¨f’s theory of sets as con-
structive type theory and to Aczel’s as (axiomatic) constructive set
theory.
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1.1. Bishop style constructive mathematics. Constructive type the-
ory aims at a codification of a genuinely constructive notion of set
which is sufficiently expressive to allow for a full formalisation of
constructive mathematics. It also pursues the aim of expressing
mathematical statements in a way which is in time with the tech-
nological changes which have modified the world surrounding us.
In fact, its formalism also represents a very abstract and powerful
programming language.
When referring to constructive mathematics, we here have in
mind the constructive mathematics which has been and is devel-
oped by E. Bishop and his school.1 The distinguished American
mathematician published his Foundations of constructive analysis
in 1967 [6]. The book as well as subsequent work by the Bishop
school proved the possibility to develop considerable parts of math-
ematics on the basis of intuitionistic logic.2 More importantly, it also
showed that this can be accomplished without contradicting classi-
cal mathematics. The essential advantage with respect to classical
mathematics is that the results now have a distinctive algorithmic
flavour. In fact, in a constructive context the computational con-
tent of a mathematical theorem arises directly from its proof. More
specifically, a constructive proof of a statement of the form ‘for all
objects of type A there exists an object of type B such that . . . ’ in
principle provides us with an algorithm which given an object of A
produces a witness in B of the truth of this statement. It should also
be noted that proofs in constructive mathematics may be harder and
more complex, but are certainly more informative. Clearly, one can
not expect to obtain the same scope of results which have honoured
the classical tradition. From a constructive point of view, however,
a classical theorem not amenable of constructive treatment simply
is not justified or even meaningful.
From an historical perspective, it is worth observing that Bishop
presented his new approach to mathematics in an informal style, as
close as possible to the classical one. He thus made it accessible to
1 It seems now a practice to refer to mathematicians working in constructive
mathematics in the style of Bishop as the Bishop school. From an historical
point of view, it should be stressed that some of the recognised representative of
the ‘school’ like, for example, D. Bridges were not students of Bishop.
2 For a comprehensive treatment of constructive analysis see Bishop and
Bridges [7].
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the wider community of mathematicians, crossing the boundary of
the limited circle of partisans of intuitionism.3
Bishop’s book of 1967 had an enduring impact on the logi-
cal community. Logicians like S. Feferman ([12]), J. Myhill ([24]),
H. Friedmann [15] immediately felt the need to produce formal sys-
tems which could provide a clear foundation for Bishop’s analysis,
which had been presented by its author in an informal way.4
1.2. Martin–Lo¨f type theory. Martin–Lo¨f type theory also arouse
in the late sixties as a system in which to formalise Bishop style
mathematics. As an element of distinction it retains from the very
beginning a more philosophical inclination, if compared with other
foundational systems. The theory seems to have arisen from a re-
flection on the essence of constructive reasoning and especially on
the notion of constructive set, the syntactical details not preceding
but following the semantical considerations. In developing his type
theory, Martin–Lo¨f had numerous sources of inspiration. B. Russell
founded type theory at the beginning of the last century as a reaction
to the paradoxes which had plagued the new–born foundational sys-
tems for mathematics. A. Church also introduced a theory of types
in the context of his lambda calculus. He thus amended similar
difficulties which had arisen in following the temptation of erect-
ing a comprehensive foundational theory on the basis of a calculus
whose primordial aim was to formalise and explicate the notion of
function. Martin–Lo¨f adopted the fundamental Russellian idea for
which a type is a domain of quantification. He also combined this
with ideas from the typed lambda calculus, of which his type theory
can be seen as a particular version (characterised by predicativity
3 The so called Bishop school in general has on our view the merit of empha-
sising the relevance per se` of constructive results as well as the computational
impact of their approach and the benefits for the understanding. Another as-
pect which seems in general to characterise the approach of the Bishop school
is that questions of a more philosophical nature, for example related to the spe-
cific constructive method or the ontological status of the mathematical object,
do not concern the constructive mathematician. In the author’s view this is
rather a limitation than a merit of the school, whose technical contributions are
undoubtedly far reaching.
4 See Feferman’s [13] for a clear account of different approaches to constructive
mathematics and foundations. Beeson’s [5] is also a useful source of information.
The monograph [8] by Bridges and Richman focuses instead on different varieties
of constructive mathematics.
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and the presence of dependent types). In adapting the notion of type
to a constructive context the Swedish mathematician also benefitted
from the reflections by D. Scott ([26]), G. Kreisel and N. D. Good-
man ([18], [19], [17]).5 It is apparent from the way constructive type
theory is formulated and especially from the relevance that meaning
explanations have in the presentation and justification of the sys-
tem, that G. Gentzen’s natural deduction in the form adopted by
D. Prawitz must have also played a significant role. We also assume
that Martin–Lo¨f was aware of the research completed within the
AUTOMATH project, led by N. G. de Brujin (see for example [11]).
Here a significant part of mathematics was proof–checked by a ma-
chine and wide use of the so called Curry–Howard correspondence
was made for the first time (see section 1.4). The correspondence
is doubtlessly one of the fundamental constituents of constructive
type theory.6
1.3. Two approaches to the notion of set. As already mentioned,
the monograph [23] is mainly committed to spelling out a construc-
tive notion of set. We are thus induced to try and elucidate which
relationship links this notion of set with the concept which arises
in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. The following is simply an attempt
to discuss this relationship and does not claim to be in any way
a compelling and comprehensive analysis. On the contrary, we be-
lieve that an accurate investigation ought to be carried out to better
clarify this point.7
From a purely syntactical point of view, there is an obvious dif-
ference between axiomatic set theory and type theory with regard
5 See [21] for a brief historical account.
6 A note to recall that the original version of constructive type theory (never
come to print) was shown inconsistent by J. Y. Girard ([16]). The assumption
which made it inconsistent was that of the existence of a type of all types. It
appears that Martin–Lo¨f was led to this assumption by the intent to allow for
a formalisation inside type theory of category theory. Martin–Lo¨f promptly
corrected the mistake by replacing the heavily impredicative notion of a type of
all types by a hierarchy of stronger and stronger universes, each one reflecting
all the universes occurring ‘earlier’ in the hierarchy. (See section 4.12 for the
notion of universe.)
7 I am grateful to Giovanni Sambin for a discussion we had at Venice interna-
tional University in occasion of a Springschule organised by the GKLI Mu¨nchen
in April 2004. He brought to my attention the need to deepen our understanding
of the relationship between the two notions of set as they occur in type theory
and in constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.
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to the two fundamental relations of equality and membership. In
axiomatic set theory sets may be viewed as if they were all ‘at the
same level’, the equality and membership relations connecting sets
with sets. In type theory membership relates an element with a set,
not a set with a set and equality may only hold of elements of the
same set (that is, it is relativised to a specific set) or it holds of
two sets. This syntactical distinctness underlines a deep conceptual
difference between the two notions of set. We could attempt to clar-
ify this point by imagining the universe described by the axiomatic
theories as an unstratified uniform collection of objects essentially
of the same kind and nested one inside the other according to the
axioms of the theory. A hierarchical structure is imposed ‘a posteri-
ori’ on the universe by assigning a rank level (an ordinal) to each set
(via the foundation axiom). The type–theoretic universe, instead, is
made of sets and these of elements, but the latter can not be in turn
considered to be sets. One could also say that the type–theoretic
universe is more rigid in structure and represents a stratified notion
of set, while the Cantorian notion of set is essentially iterative. A
paradigmatic example is given by the way the fundamental concept
of natural number is represented in the two theories. Type theory
represents natural numbers as distinct, primitive objects, elements
of a set N, which is inductively generated by taking first 0 and then
repeatedly applying the successor function. Zermelo–Fraenkel set
theory in its usual formulation, obtains the natural numbers by an
iterated application of the successor operation to the empty set.8
The successor operation is a set–theoretic operation, which allows
us to move from sets to sets and it is formulated so to ensure that the
natural numbers satisfy the fundamental property of transitivity.9
Before proceeding with our discussion a remark is mandatory.
In the second part of this project we shall see that an appropriate
version of type theory allows for a natural interpretation of construc-
tive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. In fact, as Aczel [1] has shown,
the iterative concept of set can be captured within Martin–Lo¨f type
theory by a specific type construction: sets are seen as elements of a
particular inductive type. Here, though, we attempt a comparison
8 Note that there are also formulations of set theory (for example Zermelo’s)
which allow for urelements as well as sets.
9 A set is transitive if its elements are subsets of it.
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between the iterative notion of set and the more general notion ad-
vanced in Martin–Lo¨f’s [23] (in other terms sets as elements of the
first universe rather than sets as elements of an inductive type built
over the universe).
Another important characteristic of type theory which distin-
guishes it from other constructive and classical theories is the fact
that it is ‘logic free’. While Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory is based on
the first order predicate calculus, type theory is defined by a series
of rules of set formation which do not presuppose logic in any way.
Indeed, by simply modifying the reading of the notion of set, and
seeing it as expressing a notion of proposition, specific instances of
the rules yield the intuitionistic calculus in natural deduction form.
This is essentially a consequence of embracing the Curry–Howard
correspondence. As we shall see the propositions–as–types para-
digm has far reaching consequences for the theory, among which the
validity of a form of choice principle.
The previous considerations compare axiomatic set theory with
type theory and apply to classical as well as intuitionistic versions
of set theory. We believe that there is another significant difference
between classical set theory (at least in the way it is often presented)
and the approach proposed by Martin–Lo¨f and also adopted in con-
structive versions of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. The dissimilarity
concerns the status of the universe of sets. Typically the classical
set theorist sees our mathematical activity as the gradual disclosure
of properties of the universe of sets. By considering stronger prin-
ciples as part of the stock of axioms of our set theory, we can in
general discover properties of a wider fragment of this universe. In
a constructive context, instead, according to the intuitionistic view
which ascribes a more relevant role to the thinking subject, the uni-
verse of sets can not be considered as ‘given’ to us in any way. It
is rather a mental construction and thus possesses the features of
an open concept, it is a universe ‘in fieri’. New stronger principles
determine a new form of universe which exists by the same act of
postulating the new principles.
An essential feature of constructive type theory, also shared by
constructive set theory, is its commitment to predicativitiy.10 These
10 See Myhill [24] for a discussion on the issue of predicativity for constructive
set theory. For a deeper and more general account of mathematics developed in
a predicative context see for example Feferman [14].
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theories are in fact formulated so to prevent any use of strongly
impredicative operations on sets such as powerset and unrestricted
comprehension. The reason advanced for avoiding these operations
is simply that they can not be justified by the bottom up approach to
the notion of set which follows from the insight on what constitutes a
constructive set. It is also believed that no essentially impredicative
notion is needed for the development of constructive mathematics.
Finally, we have already mentioned that the computational read-
ing has a key role for type theory: sets correspond in fact to data
types and type theory may be seen as a very abstract programming
language. This clearly distinguishes the notion of set of type the-
ory from the ‘Cantorian’ notion, which was developed well before
the advent of computers and seems to retain a purely mathematical
scope.11
1.4. Curry–Howard isomorphism. Type theory makes essential use
of the so called Curry–Howard correspondence (also known as ‘pro-
positions–as–types’ or Curry–Howard isomorphism). This is a cor-
respondence between propositions and proofs on the one side and
types and elements on the other (see for example [28] for a clear
presentation and an historical account of the correspondence). The
isomorphism becomes clear if we compare the notions of truth which
characterise classical and intuitionistic logic. Classically a proposi-
tion is either true or false; truth therefore coincides, in ‘Fregean’
spirit, with admitting values in a two elements set {t, f}. Intuition-
istically, instead, a proposition is true if it is provable, that is if we
can, at least in principle, provide a proof of it (not necessarily in a
formal system). The Curry–Howard correspondence is obtained by
keeping this latter notion of truth in mind and identifying a propo-
sition with the collection (or type) of its proofs.






11 Krivine [20] has recently addressed the question of whether it is possible
to extract computational content from classical set theory.
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The rule allows us to derive an implication of the form A ⊃ B,
whenever from a proof of A we can obtain a proof of B. This can also
be expressed by saying that a proof of A ⊃ B is a ‘function’ which
transforms any proof a of A in a proof b(a) of B. Utilising the no-
tation of the Lambda calculus we can write this as λx : A. b(x) : B,
where x : A denotes that x is an object of type A. The correspon-
dence then associates to the proposition A ⊃ B the set A → B of
functions from A to B, the elements of which can also be seen as
proofs of the proposition A ⊃ B.
1.5. Type theory as a programming language. In this section we
briefly expand on the view for which type theory can be thought
of as a rather general and expressive programming language. For a
monograph on type theory which takes this perspective see [25].
We observe that the link with programming languages which is
characteristic of type theory makes it a particularly suitable foun-
dation for constructive mathematics a` la Bishop. In this variety
of constructive mathematics, in fact, intuitive computability consti-
tutes proof of existence. In his ‘constructive manifesto’ [6] Bishop
writes:
Our program is simple: to give numerical meaning
to as much as possible of classical abstract analysis.
Our motivation is the well–known scandal, exposed
by Brouwer (and others) in great detail, that classi-
cal mathematics is deficient in numerical meaning.
On a more practical ground, the link with programming has
probably determined most of recent interest in type theory. The
theory has in the last 20 years been implemented in various proof
development systems. In particular, the system NuPRL (R. Con-
stable et al., Cornell University, see for example [10] and [9]) im-
plements a theory inspired by Martin–Lo¨f type theory. The family
of systems known under the acronym ALF (developed in Go¨teborg,
see [4]) is directly motivated by constructive type theory.12
The correspondence between constructive theories and program-
ming can be rapidly hinted at as follows. Let us consider a statement
12 NuPRL abbreviates ‘New Proof Refinement Logic’, while ALF stands for
‘Another Logical Framework’. Alfa is presently the proof assistant of the ALF




∀x ∈ A∃y ∈ B P (x, y)(1)
By Curry–Howard we can associate to it a set, whose elements
are lambda terms representing proofs of the statement. More pre-
cisely, a proof of (1) is a function which to each element a of A
assigns a proof b(a) of ∃y ∈ BP (a, y). In turn, b(a) can be thought
of as a pair whose first component, d, is an element of B (the witness
of the existential quantifier) while the second component is a proof
of P (a, d). One can now read the lambda term as a program (for
example by applying an automatic translation of it in the favourite
programming language). Then (1) will be a specification for this
program while A represents the set of inputs and B the set of out-
puts. It is important to note that by this process we not only obtain
a lambda term (or program) from a proof of a statement, but we also
gain a verification that the program does what it is expected to do.
This has lead to the idea of semi-automatising the process of proof
as well as automatising the process of deriving the corresponding
term (and consequently the program as written in a specific lan-
guage). Ideally, in a correct system, programs obtained from proofs
will have the advantage of not requiring any verification.
The descriptions and comparisons until now put forward of the
notion of set in type theory and in other theories will become more
perspicuous by the following concise account of the theory itself.
2. Propositions and Judgments
We are now heading to a presentation of the theory of sets of
constructive type theory. We first of all expand on the observation
we already made that in the general context of type theory the
notion of set is only a particular kind of type, characterised by the
fact that we can exhaust its elements by means of a finite number of
rules. An example of set is the collection of all natural numbers. Its
elements are inductively specified as follows: 0 is a natural number
and every successor of a natural number is a natural number. In
addition, we can establish when two natural numbers are equal: they
are equal if they are either both 0 or successors of equal natural
numbers.13 A type in general might not be amenable of such a
description: the notion of type is much more vague and open than
13 N is in fact a particular kind of set as its rules have an inductive character.
Sets in Martin–Lo¨f type theory 357
that of set. It amounts essentially to a collection furnished with an
equivalence relation on it, by means of which we compare elements
of the type. As an example of type, we can consider the collection
of all sets. This is not itself a set, as we have in general no rule
which allows us to describe when something is a set. The distinction
between types and sets resembles that between classes and sets in
axiomatic set theory.14
2.1. Judgments. Constructive type theory is formulated by a series
of rules. A rule enables us to make a judgment usually from one or
more hypothesis. By means of a judgment, on the other hand, we
assert properties of sets or, by virtue of the Curry–Howard corre-
spondence, of propositions. The distinction between judgments and
propositions is of essential importance to the understanding of type
theory. As an example, the judgments ‘A set’ and ‘A prop’ state the
fact that the collection A is a set and that A is a proposition, respec-
tively. A proposition is here the object of a judgment. It should be
stressed that this method of defining a theory is quite different from
the axiomatic approach. In the latter we single out some proposi-
tions, the axioms, and use them in conjunction with the derivation
rules to obtain new propositions. Here we derive judgments which
are made out of propositions. Furthermore, the same concept of
proposition is open–ended, as the collection of propositions does
not form a set but a type.
The definition of the theory by means of rules manipulating
judgments seems to harmonise with Martin–Lo¨f’s clarifying the se-
mantics of the rules prior to introducing their syntax. The author
always ensures the meaning of each new set or constructor is ex-
plained in full and hence justified, thus conforming to the intuition-
istic conception of what constitutes mathematical activity.
2.2. Categorical judgments. We shall now introduce the 4 funda-
mental forms of categorical judgments, that is those judgments not
depending on assumptions. In the next section we shall consider the
corresponding hypothetical judgments. The categorical judgments
are as follows:
(a) A set, that is A is a set;
(b) A = B, that is A and B are equal sets;
14 A presentation of a type theory with types as formal objects may be found
in [25].
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(c) a ∈ A, that is a is an element of the set A;
(d) a = b ∈ A, that is a and b are equal elements of the set A.
Each form of judgment can be read in different ways. By Curry–
Howard we may for example read them as assertions on propositions.
The first and the third judgments can then be expressed as: ‘A is a
proposition’ (or simply A prop) and ‘a is a proof of the proposition
A’. In agreement with the intuitionistic concept of truth, for which
truth is provability, the judgment a ∈ A can also be restated as
‘A true’. The proposition A, in fact, is true provided that it has
a proof; when viewed as a set, this means that it is inhabited or,
equivalently, it has some element. Observe that we here deliberately
omit the information on which element of A we take as witness of
the truth of A. We nonetheless assume that we can at any time
recover all information regarding the witness for a judgment of the
form A true; in fact the justification of this form of judgment lies
in this same possibility.
One can read categorical judgments also in a more intensional
manner: a proposition could be interpreted as a problem we want
to solve or as a task to perform.15 In this case a ∈ A could be read
as a is a method for solving problem A or for accomplishing task A.
Each form of judgment can be explained as follows.
(a) The first form of judgment allows us to state what consti-
tutes a set in our theory. It answers the question: ‘what is a set?’
The answer to this question is very much in the style of Bishop: a
set is determined by its elements and each set comes equipped with
an equivalence relation which establishes which of its elements are
equal. More precisely:
We define a set A by prescribing:
(i) how to form a canonical element of A,
(ii) how to form two equal canonical elements of A.
Paradigmatic example is the set of natural numbers, N. This is
defined first of all by postulating the introduction rules:
0 ∈ N 0 = 0 ∈ N
a ∈ N
suc(a) ∈ N
a = b ∈ N
suc(a) = suc(b) ∈ N
15 This is reminiscent of Kolmogorov’s description of propositions.
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The rules specify the canonical elements of N, that is the 0 and
all the objects of the form suc(a) for a in N, and they also establish
when two such elements are equal.
A set in general will contain other elements a part from the
canonical ones. In the case of the natural numbers, the non–
canonical elements are those elements of N which can be reduced to
its canonical elements by a computational or reduction process. For
example 2 + 2 represents a non–canonical element of N. Its mem-
bership inN is justified by the fact that applying the computational
rules defining + to 2 + 2 one obtains a canonical element of N.
The computation rules for operations like + are introduced by
the elimination rule for N. Elimination rules also enable us to spec-
ify that no other canonical elements a part from those arising from
the introduction rules are in the specific set.16
(b) For the second kind of judgment we notice first of all that
we assume that A and B are sets, hence in fact we presuppose a
judgment of the first kind. Then we state that A = B whenever
the two sets are extensionally equal, that is if for any a ∈ A we also
have a ∈ B, and viceversa. A set is described not only by defining
its elements but also by establishing when two of its elements are
equal. Therefore for A and B to be equal we also have to ensure
that for any two elements a, b of A, if a = b ∈ A then also a = b ∈ B,
and viceversa. All this can be expressed in a more compact way by
stating:
A = B if and only if
a ∈ A
a ∈ B
a = b ∈ A
a = b ∈ B
The double line here indicates the possibility to go from the
judgment above the line to the one below and viceversa.
(c) The third kind of judgment allows us to assert when an
object is an element of a set. Martin–Lo¨f explains this form of judg-
ment in an evocative way by appealing to the alternative readings
of the notion of set previously recalled.
16 Note that in the case of inductive sets like the natural numbers, the specific
form of the elimination rules can have an impact on the proof–theoretic strength
of the resulting theory.
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An element a of a set A is a method or program which when
executed produces a canonical element of A as its result.
(d) The third kind of judgment is explained as follows: Two
elements a and b of a set A are equal if once executed they produce
equal canonical elements of A as their result.
2.3. Hypothetical judgments. The forms of judgment introduced un-
til now are independent from any assumption, they are categorical.
We consider next hypothetical judgments. These are essential if we
want to represent mathematical reasoning in type theory.
For simplicity, we shall start by considering the case of a par-
ticular form of judgment depending only on one hypothesis and
generalise later on to the case of judgments depending on many
hypothesis. This simple kind of judgement has the form:
B(x) set (x ∈ A).
We assert that B(x) is a set under the hypothesis x ∈ A. We also
say that B(x) is a family of sets depending on A. The judgment
yields that B(a) is a set whenever a is an element of A, and that if
a and b are equal elements of A, then B(a) and B(b) are equal.
Note that for typographical reasons in the following we shall
make use of two different notations for hypothetical judgments:




Let us now see the case of n premises.
(i) Assume the following judgments:
A1 set,
A2(x1) set (x1 ∈ A1),
A3(x1, x2) set (x1 ∈ A1, x2 ∈ A2(x1)),
etc.
An(x1, . . . , xn−1) set
under the hypothesis
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(x1 ∈ A1, x2 ∈ A2(x1), . . . , xn−1 ∈ An−1(x1, . . . , xn−2)).
We can then formulate the new judgment:
A(x1, . . . , xn) set
under the hypothesis:
(x1 ∈ A1, x2 ∈ A2(x1), . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1)).
A2(x1) set (x1 ∈ A1) expresses the fact that A2(x1) is a set
under the hypothesis x1 ∈ A1. This means that A2(a) is a set
whenever a ∈ A1 and also that A2(a) = A2(b) if a = b ∈ A1.
Similarly A3(x1, x2) set (x1 ∈ A1, x2 ∈ A2(x1)) states the fact
that A3(x1, x2) is a family of sets depending on the sets A1
and A2(x1). The other judgments can be justified in a similar
way.
An implicit convention applies for which Ai may (but does
not need to) depend from xj with j < i, and it does not depend
from xi, and so also A may depend from xi but not from x.
The n assumptions in a judgment constitute the context,
often written Γ,∆, . . . . Similarly to the case of natural de-
duction, also in type theory some of the rules allow for the
discharge of assumptions (an assumption is discharged if it
appears in the premise but not in the conclusion of a rule).
Clearly care is required in respecting the order of the assump-
tions to be discharged, especially in the case of a rather com-
plex context.
It should now be clear how to justify the following judgments
(written in the second notation):
(ii)
(x1 ∈ A1, x2 ∈ A2(x1), . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1))
A(x1, . . . , xn) = B(x1, . . . , xn).
(iii)
(x1 ∈ A1, x2 ∈ A2(x1), . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1))
a(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A(x1, . . . , xn).
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(iv)
(x1 ∈ A1, x2 ∈ A2(x1), . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1))
a(x1, . . . , xn) = b(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A(x1, . . . , xn).
3. Assumption, equality and substitution rules
3.1. Conventions. Before introducing the rules which describe what
amounts to a set and when a new set can be formed from given ones,
we need to clarify the structure of the theory and introduce some
rules of a syntactical nature, for example those regulating substitu-
tion. But first of all some conventions are in order, which are in use
to facilitate the reading and the understanding of the rules.
(i) An assumption which occurs both in the premise and in the
conclusion of a rule is not written out.
(ii) A discharged assumption which is stated in the premise may
be unutilised in the actual derivation of a judgment.
(iii) In case of rules with conclusion of the form a ∈ A or a = b ∈ A,
we only explicitly recall the assumptions which have the same
form as the conclusion.
3.2. Assumption rule. This is the only rule which introduces new
assumptions which do not already occur in the hypothesis. For
clarity we shall write it in its complete form, without making use of
the conventions just stated. It reads:
A set (x1 ∈ A1, . . . , xn ∈ An)
x ∈ A (x1 ∈ A1, . . . , xn ∈ An, x ∈ A)
3.3. Note on equality. In type theory there are three distinct notions
of equality which should be carefully kept distinct. The first is at
the level of judgements, the second is a way to postulate syntactical
conventions and the third is at the level of propositions. We observe
that the way the first and the third kind of equality interact has a
strong impact on the properties of the resulting theory, in particular
with respect to its intensionality or extensionality (see section 4.7).
(1) Judgemental equality. We have already seen the equality
which occurs in judgments. We can assert that:
(i) two sets are equal;
(ii) two elements in a set are equal.
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(2) Definitional equality. Definitional equality, here written := ,
is utilised to postulate syntactical conventions or rewriting
rules.
(3) Propositional equality. This notion of equality allows us to
reflect judgmental equality at the level of propositions. In
section 4.7 we introduce a set I(A, a, b) which is inhabited
whenever a = b ∈ A is a valid judgment.
3.4. Equality rules. The equality rules are divided into rules for el-
ements and rules for sets. They ensure that judgmental equality
satisfies the usual properties of an equivalence relation: reflexivity,
symmetry and transitivity. In the case of sets, we also postulate a
rule for which equal sets have the same elements (and equal ele-
ments).
We believe these rules are particularly clear, therefore we only
state them without any explanation (see Martin–Lo¨f [23]).
Reflexivity:
a ∈ A




a = b ∈ A




a = b ∈ A b = c ∈ A
a = c ∈ A
A = B B = C
A = C
Equality rule for sets:
a ∈ A A = B
a ∈ B
a = b ∈ A A = B
a = b ∈ B
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3.5. Substitution rules. The following substitution rules are justi-
fied by simply inspecting the meaning of hypothetical judgments as





















a = c ∈ A
(x ∈ A)
b(x) ∈ B(x)
b(a) = b(c) ∈ B(a)
Substitution in equal elements:
a ∈ A
(x ∈ A)
b(x) = d(x) ∈ B(x)
b(a) = d(a) ∈ B(a)
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4. Rules for sets
4.1. Kinds of rules. We shall now present the four kinds of rules
which allow us to introduce basic sets and to form new sets from
given ones. Departing from the presentation in [23] we shall here
define first of all the sets of natural numbers and of finite sets as
they are very perspicuous. We shall subsequently define new sets
from given ones by means of fundamental operations like product,
sum, etc.
All the rules we shall introduce have a common structure, as





(i) The first kind of rules tells us when we can form a new set,
often from given ones or from a family of sets. It also establishes
when we can form equal sets. Alternatively, these rules can be seen
as describing how to obtain new propositions (from given ones or
from propositional functions) and how to compare propositions.
(ii) The second kind of rules enables us to establish which are
the canonical elements of a set and when they are equal. As we
have already seen, a set is defined by postulating which canonical
elements belong to it and when they are equal. These rules thus
assign a meaning to the new set. They sometimes introduce new
constants, like for example 0, and usually describe the behaviour of
new constructors, like suc, λ, etc.
(iii) The third kind of rules allows us to make use of the elements
of the set. The elimination rules often constitute a form of struc-
tural induction: to establish that a property holds of an arbitrary
element of a set, it is enough to prove that it inductively holds of
the canonical elements of the same set. This kind of rule introduces
a new elimination constant (or destructor): when applied to argu-
ments representing the validity of the inductive hypothesis, it allows
us to obtain a proof of a proposition which expresses the validity of
the given property for an arbitrary element. In the case of induc-
tive types like N, the elimination rule also provides recursion (as a
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proof or element of the induction principle expressed by the elimina-
tion rule). They therefore explain how to ‘compute’ non–canonical
elements.
(iv) The last kind of rules relates introduction and elimination
rules by showing how an elimination constant operates on canonical
elements of the set.
4.2. Natural numbers. The existence of a completed set of natural
numbers is rarely disputed by mathematicians, logicians or philoso-
phers of mathematics. Predicativists like Poincare´ or Weyl assumed
its existence. The existence of a set of natural numbers is in particu-
lar asserted by the intuitionists. It is indeed the most paradigmatic
example of infinite set which emerges in the realm of mathematics.
Doubtlessly, for the intuitionist the fundamental characteristic of
mathematics is having infinity as its object. The departure from
classical logic is determined exactly by the fact that mathematics
deals with the infinity; classical logic is on the contrary modeled
after finite domains and is therefore only adequate for them.
In type theory the set of natural numbers, N, is inductively
defined as follows: we first establish that 0 is a natural number and
then that for each natural number a its successor, suc(a), is also a
natural number. Simultaneously, we establish when two elements of
N are equal.
Given the set of natural numbers, we clearly aim at utilising it
for arithmetical computations. We then need to define the ordinary
operations of addition, multiplication etc on natural numbers. For
this purpose we introduce a new constant, R, in the elimination rule
and uniformly define by means of it all primitive recursive functions.
The specific behaviour of the ‘destructor’ R will be clarified only
after introducing the elimination rule.
In the case of N we shall indicate the rules in full, that is, also
with their corresponding rules for equality. The latter will instead be
omitted for the other sets (with the only exception of the product).17
(i) N-Formation
N set N = N
17 See for example Beeson [5] for a schematic summary of all rules.
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(ii) N-Introduction
0 ∈ N 0 = 0 ∈ N
a ∈ N
suc(a) ∈ N
a = b ∈ N
suc(a) = suc(b) ∈ N
(iii) N-Elimination
c ∈ N d ∈ C(0)
(x ∈ N, y ∈ C(x))
e(x, y) ∈ C(suc(x))
R(c, d, e) ∈ C(c)
c = f ∈ N d = g ∈ C(0)
(x ∈ N, y ∈ C(x))
e(x, y) = h(x, y) ∈ C(suc(x))
R(c, d, e) = R(f, g, h) ∈ C(c)
(iv) N-Equality
d ∈ C(0)
(x ∈ N, y ∈ C(x))
e(x, y) ∈ C(suc(x))
R(0, d, e) = d ∈ C(0)
a ∈ N d ∈ C(0)
(x ∈ N, y ∈ C(x))
e(x, y) ∈ C(suc(x))
R(suc(a), d, e) = e(a,R(a, d, e)) ∈ C(suc(a))
In the last two rules C(z) is a family of sets depending on N.
The only rule which requires explanation is the elimination rule.
It can be clarified as follows.
Given an arbitrary element, c, of N (that is an element which
is possibly non–canonical), we can read C(c) as a proposition for
which we require a proof. The rule then enables us to prove C(c) by
induction. We form first of all a proof d of C(0). Then provided that
for x ∈ N, y is a proof of C(x), we give a proof e(x, y) of C(suc(x)).
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The rule gives us a proof R(c, d, e) (depending from c, d and e), of
the proposition C(c).
More precisely, R(c, d, e) is computed as follows.
(1) Take an arbitrary element, c, ofN and compute its canonical
value;
(2) if the result of the computation is c = 0 ∈ N, then compute
d ∈ C(0), hence obtaining a new canonical element f of
C(0). Note that c = 0 ∈ N, so that C(c) = C(0) and so f
will be a canonical element also of C(c);
(3) if instead the computation produces an element of N of
the form suc(a) for a ∈ N, then proceed as follows: sub-
stitute a for x and R(a, d, e) for y in e, hence obtaining
e(a,R(a, d, e)) ∈ C(suc(a)). Note that C(suc(a)) = C(c),
so that e(a,R(a, d, e)) ∈ C(c). Compute the latter, thus
obtaining a canonical element g, of C(c);
(4) if a has value 0, then R(a, d, e) ∈ C(c) by (2); otherwise
proceed again as in (3).
As an example we define the following operations of predecessor,
addition and multiplication, respectively.
pred(x) := R(x, 0, (x, y).x),
+(x, y) := R(x, y, (z, w).suc(w)),
∗(x, y) := R(x, 0, (z, w).+ (y, w)).
We write (x, y).t to denote that x, y are the substitution vari-
ables from t. Parenthesis are here used in a similar way to the usual
λ notation from lambda calculus. We use parenthesis because λ is a
reserved character in type theory representing a primitive constant
which characterises canonical elements of the cartesian product.
4.3. Finite sets. We now aim at introducing finite sets. For each
natural number k we define a set Nk, which has k elements. In
the usual set–theoretic notation, this would be represented as the
set {0k, 1k, . . . , (k − 1)k}. Note however that the objects of Nk do
not coincide with the first k elements of N: for example, 0 is to be
considered as distinct from 0k.
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For each natural number k, we have the 4 rules ofNk–formation,





mk ∈ Nk (m = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1)
(iii) Nk–Elimination
c ∈ Nk cm ∈ C(mk) (m = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1)
Rk(c, c0, . . . , ck−1) ∈ C(c)
(iv) Nk–Equality
cm ∈ C(mk) (m = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1)
Rk(mk, c0, . . . , ck−1) = cm ∈ C(mk)
Once more C(x) (x ∈ Nk) is a family of sets and can also be
seen as a propositional function asserting a property of elements of
Nk. Rk represents a form of definition by cases.
We can explain the elimination rule as follows.
(1) Execute c, so to obtain as result a canonical element mk of
Nk with (m = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1);
(2) choose the corresponding element, cm, of C(mk) and execute
it. One obtains as a result a canonical element d ∈ C(mk).
Since c = mk ∈ Nk, we have that C(c) = C(mk) and so
d ∈ C(c).
Note that the set N0 represents the empty set, as it has no
elements. In this case the introduction rule is void. The elimination
rule becomes instead:
18 The presence of an infinite number of rules like in the case of the finite sets
can be problematic when defining for example an elimination rule for a reflecting
universe (see section 4.12). One can in this case rather introduce only two sets





The set N1 has instead only one element, namely 01.19
4.3.1. True, false, booleans. If looking at finite sets as propositions,
then N0 coincides with falsity, not possessing any element (that
is, proof). It is also indicated by ⊥. The set N1 coincides with
truth, being always inhabited by a canonical element, 01. The set
N2, whose elements are 02 and 12, may be seen as representing the
booleans, which are ubiquitous in programming languages.
When one reads N0 as ⊥, the elimination rule becomes the well
known natural deduction rule ex falso quodlibet:
⊥-Elimination ⊥ true
C true
Note that in this case we are free to eliminate the information
concerning the witness both in the premise and in the conclusion of
the rule.
As an example of how to utilise type–theoretic constructs to
define notions commonly used in programming languages, one can
see that R2(c, d, f) allows us to represent ‘if c then d else f’.
The rules presented until now allow us to introduce new sets like
N or Nk (for any k). We shall now see how to introduce new sets
from given ones or from families of sets. From a purely syntactical
point of view, the following introduction rules have premises.
4.4. Generalised (cartesian) product. Given a set A and a family of
sets B(x) (x ∈ A), we aim at forming a new set whose elements
represent functions with arguments in A and values in the given
family of sets.
We observe that the concept of function here represented is more
general than the ordinary one between sets A and B. A function is
here a correspondence which takes an element a of A to an element
b(a) of a set B(a) depending from a. The codomain of the function,
in other terms, is not a fixed set but it depends from the specific
argument of the function. This is the first example we encounter of
19 This needs to be proved. Since it requires constructors, like propositional
identity, yet not introduced, we omit its proof. The reader may wish to consult
[23].
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a dependent type. The importance of dependent types lies in the ex-
pressiveness they confer to the theory without for this enforcing the
step into impredicativity. As an example, the generalised cartesian
product allows us to express universal quantification at the level of
propositions.
The canonical elements of Π(A,B) are functions obtained by
λ abstraction: from an element b(x) of B(x) we abstract b and we
apply to it λ thus obtaining λ(b), which is a canonical element of
the product. The basic idea here is that b(x) ∈ B(x)(x ∈ A) is a
function of which λ(b) is a name or representative.
Equality for canonical elements of the product is derived from
equality in the family of sets B(x)(x ∈ A). In fact, two canonical
elements λ(b) and λ(d) are equal if for x ∈ A we have b(x) = d(x) ∈
B(x) (equality rule for Π-introduction). The notion of function is
hence extensional.
By Π(A,B) or (Πx ∈ A)B(x) we denote the product of A times
the family B (depending on A), and by λ(b) a canonical element of
the product. An explanation of the use of the elimination constant
Ap will be given after introducing all the rules.
In the case of the product, to increase insight in the theory and
single out extensionality, we recall also the rules for equality.














b(x) = d(x) ∈ B(x)
λ(b) = λ(d) ∈ Π(A,B)
(iii) Π - Elimination
c ∈ Π(A,B) a ∈ A
Ap(c, a) ∈ B(a)
c = f ∈ Π(A,B) a = d ∈ A
Ap(c, a) = Ap(f, d) ∈ B(a)
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Ap(λ(b), a) = b(a) ∈ B(a)
c ∈ Π(A,B)
(λx)Ap(c, x) = c ∈ Π(A,B)
We can now explain the use of the elimination constant Ap.
In general, Ap(c, a) is a method which allows us to obtain ele-
ments of B(a). It can be used as follows.
(1) Calculate c ∈ Π(A,B), obtaining as a result a canonical
element, λ(b), for b(x) ∈ B(x)(x ∈ A);
(2) given a ∈ A substitute it for x in b. We thus obtain b(a) ∈
B(a);
(3) calculate b(a), to produce a canonical element of B(a).
The elimination rule clearly represents an analogue of
β–reduction in the lambda calculus. Alternatively, one could opt
for an elimination rule representing a structural induction principle
(see for example [25] pages 51 and 52).
4.4.1. Universal quantifier. The rules for the product may also be
read as referring to propositions, in which case they represent the
usual natural deduction rules for the universal quantifier. In the





(∀x ∈ A)B(x) prop
Note that the judgment A set is unchanged in the propositional




(∀x ∈ A)B(x) true
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∀ - Elimination
(∀x ∈ A)B(x) true a ∈ A
B(a) true
As in the propositional reading of the Π–rules the witnesses
are not explicitly presented, there is here no corresponding rule for
equality.
4.4.2. Function space and implication. We obtain a particular case
of the product Π(A,B) when the family B does not depend on the
set A. The product then represents the function space from the set
A to the set B, and is denoted by A→ B or BA.
It is important to remark here a difference between axiomatic set
theory and type theory. The notion of function is in fact represented
in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory by that of ordered pair. Here it is
instead a primitive notion not reducible to that of set.
When reading A and B as propositions, A → B represents the









A ⊃ B true
⊃ - Elimination
A ⊃ B true A true
B true
Note that the introduction and elimination rules for ⊃ corre-
spond exactly to the respective rules of natural deduction. The
formation rule has the peculiarity of allowing us to make use of the
premise A true to prove that B is a proposition.
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4.4.3. Negation. As in the usual intuitionistic calculus, negation is
defined in terms of ⊃ and ⊥. We let ¬A := A ⊃ ⊥.
4.5. Generalised sum. Given a set A and a family B(x)(x ∈ A) de-
pending on A, we aim at forming a set whose elements are pairs,
the first component of which is an element of A and the second an
element of B. In other terms we aim at a generalisation of the usual
cartesian product to the case in which B is not just a set but a
family of sets. This will be represented by an operator Σ applied to
A and the family B, written Σ(A,B) or (Σx ∈ A)B(x).





(ii) Σ - Introduction
a ∈ A b ∈ B(a)
〈a, b〉 ∈ Σ(A,B)
(iii) Σ - Elimination
c ∈ Σ(A,B)
(x ∈ A, y ∈ B(x))
d(x, y) ∈ C(〈x, y〉)
E(c, d) ∈ C(c)
(iv) Σ - Equality
a ∈ A b ∈ B(a)
(x ∈ A, y ∈ B(x))
d(x, y) ∈ C(〈x, y〉)
E(〈a, b〉, d) = d(a, b) ∈ C(〈a, b〉)
In the last two rules C is a family of sets depending from
Σ(A,B).
We can explain E(c, d) as follows.
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(i) Execute c so to obtain a canonical element 〈a, b〉, of Σ(A,B);
(ii) substitute a ∈ A to x and b ∈ B(a) to y in the second premise,
so to obtain d(a, b) ∈ C(〈a, b〉);
(iii) execute d(a, b) to produce a canonical element e of C(〈a, b〉).
Note that c = 〈a, b〉 ∈ Σ(A,B), hence C(c) = C(〈a, b〉), and so
e is a canonical element of C(c).
4.5.1. Existential quantifier. The propositional mode yields the





(∃x ∈ A)B(x) prop
∃ - Introduction
a ∈ A B(a) true
(∃x ∈ A)B(x) true
∃ - Elimination
(∃x ∈ A)B(x) true
(x ∈ A, B(x) true)
C true
C true
4.5.2. Cartesian product and conjunction. Whenever B does not de-
pend on A we obtain as a particular case of Σ(A,B) the usual carte-
sian product of two sets. The corresponding propositional reading












(A true, B true)
C true
C true
The formation rule for & follows the pattern already seen for
implication, as it allows us to derive B prop from the judgment
A true. The introduction rule is exactly the rule usually found in
natural deduction. The elimination rule, instead, is a generalisation
of the two natural deduction rules and it elegantly comprehends
both of them. The usual rules can in fact be easily obtained from
this rule by instantiating C with A or B, respectively.
4.6. Disjunct sum of two sets. We now aim at representing the dis-
junct sum of two sets. Note that also in this case one could opt for
a non primitive sum, defined by Σ. We nonetheless prefer to take
+ as primitive, also taking into account the fact that in its proposi-
tional interpretation it represents disjunction, usually considered as
primitive in intuitionistic systems.
Following Martin–Lo¨f we use an infix notation for +.
The canonical elements of A+B have the form inl(a) for a ∈ A
or the form inr(b) for b ∈ B; the constants inl and inr indicate if
an element of A+B is justified by an element in A or in B. Note
that given a non–canonical element c of A+B, we can establish if c
is element of A or of B, as by calculating it one obtains a canonical
element of the form inl(a) or inr(b).
(i) + - Formation
A set B set
A+B set
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D(c, d, e) ∈ C(c)












D(inr(b), d, e) = e(b) ∈ C(inr(b))
In the last rules C is a family of sets depending from A+B.
We explain D(c, d, e) as follows.
(i) Calculate c ∈ A+B, so to obtain as a value a canonical element
of A+B of the form inl(a) for a ∈ A or inr(b) for b ∈ B;
(ii) in the first case substitute a for x in d(x), so to obtain d(a)
and calculate it. The second premise allows us to conclude that
d(a) ∈ C(inl(a)), thus calculating d(a) we obtain a canonical
element of C(inl(a));
(iii) in the second case substitute b to y in e(y) and obtain e(b) ∈
C(inr(b)). Calculate its value so to produce a canonical ele-
ment of C(inr(b));
(iv) clearly in both cases we produce a canonical element of C(c).
In fact, if c = inl(a) ∈ A+B, then C(c) = C(inl(a)), while if
c = inr(b) ∈ A+B, then C(c) = C(inr(b)).
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4.6.1. Disjunction. The propositional interpretation of + is disjunc-
tion. We here recall its rules, which faithfully reproduce the natural
deduction’s rules.
∨ - Formation














4.7. Propositional equality. As already observed there are three dis-
tinct notions of equality in type theory: judgemental equality, defi-
nitional equality and propositional equality. The latter is introduced
in type theory to reflect, at the propositional level, judgments as-
serting the equality of two elements of a set.
The rules for propositional equality might be formulated in dif-
ferent ways depending on whether we intend to capture an inten-
sional or an extensional notion of equality. The question is relevant
as the two kinds of theories represent different perspectives and are
aimed at accomplishing distinct purposes. Martin–Lo¨f has presented
intensional (see for example [21]) as well as extensional versions of
type theory. The book [23] presents an extensional theory and we
shall here take the same perspective. Extensional type theory is
clearly an appropriate and elegant setting for developing construc-
tive mathematics. Nonetheless, if one is interested for example in the
theory as a programming language, then the intensional approach
is advisable, since extensionality brings into the theory an undecid-
ability of the membership relation which affects type checking.20
20 See for example [25] for a treatment of both notions.
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(i) I - Formation
A set a ∈ A b ∈ A
I(A, a, b) set
(ii) I - Introduction
a = b ∈ A
r ∈ I(A, a, b)
(iii) I - Elimination
c ∈ I(A, a, b)
a = b ∈ A
(iv) I - Equality
c ∈ I(A, a, b)
c = r ∈ I(A, a, b)
Observe that in the I-introduction rule the element r does not
depend on a, b and A. This is a characteristic of extensional equality.
In the case of intensional rules one would instead introduce canonical
elements depending on a, b and A. Another characteristic of the
extensional elimination rule is that it allows us to move from the
propositional level back into the judgmental through the elimination
rule.
As in the case of the product, also here we could introduce an
elimination rule in the form of a structural induction principle and
derive from it the present rule (see for example [25]).
We recall that propositional equality introduces families of sets
depending from a given set. It is clearly useful in proofs of unique-
ness, as can be seen for example in the case of the uniqueness of the
element 01 of Nk.
4.8. Adequacy for constructive mathematics. Once we have devel-
oped the basics of constructive type theory it is quite natural to
question whether it indeed provides us with a foundation for con-
structive mathematics. A detailed answer to this question would
bring us too far. We simply give a very basic example of how to
formalise the fundamental notion of real number (a` la Cauchy) in
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type theory. We first briefly discuss the status of the axiom of choice
in type theory.
4.9. The axiom of choice. The axiom of choice, AC, is one of the
most controversial principles formulated in the context of set theory.
In the case of classical Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory AC is well
known (by fundamental work of Go¨del and Cohen) to be consistent
with but independent from the other axioms of set theory.
In the case of constructive versions of Zermelo–Fraenkel set the-
ory the combination of the axiom of extensionality with the other
principles of the theory produce the derivability of constructively
unacceptable instances of excluded middle.
It might then be surprising that the axiom of choice does hold
in the case of constructive type theory. This is to be ascribed to
the meaning the quantifiers have in type theory (Curry–Howard
correspondence) and to the fact that even in its extensional versions
type theory has an intensional character. Extensionality is, so to
speak, introduced on top of an intensional theory. The persistence
of an intensional character of the theory can be seen in the fact that
the elements of a set can not be characterised independently from
the set they belong to and always carry with them information on
equality for the set they belong to.
The axiom of choice is the following principle.
(∀x ∈ A)(∃y ∈ B(x))C(x, y)
⊃ (∃f ∈ Π(A,B))(∀x ∈ A)C(x,Ap(f, x)) true.
It is not difficult to see that this is indeed derivable in type theory.
A full proof can be found in [23].21
4.10. Separation. One of the essential constructions in set theory
is that of separation: given a set A we can form a subset of it
whose elements are exactly those elements of the set which satisfy
21 We observe that though the full axiom of choice is not compatible with
constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, countable choice, which is its instance
in the case in which A is the set of natural numbers, is acceptable. Similarly
the more general dependent choice principle is acceptable also in extensional
contexts. These two principles have been extensively used by the Bishop school.
We briefly also notice that if countable choice is available, then conceptually
distinct notions of real number as that of Cauchy and Dedekind reals coincide
(see for example Troelstra and van Dalen [29] for an exposition of the two notions
of set). On the other end, the theory of Cauchy reals becomes particularly
smooth in the presence of countable choice.
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a certain property B. The resulting set is usually denoted in the
intuitive curly bracket notation by {x ∈ A : B(x)}.
In type theory we can represent separation by use of Σ, by
taking Σ(A,B), where A is a set and B a propositional function
depending on A. The representation of {x ∈ A : B(x)} is then a set
of pairs the first component of which is an element, a, of A, and the
second component is a proof, b(a), that B(a) holds.
4.11. Cauchy reals. A paradigmatic example of the use of separation
is the following definition by Martin–Lo¨f of the Cauchy reals:
R := (Σx ∈ N→ Q)Cauchy(x)
where for a ∈ N→ Q,
Cauchy(a) := (∀r ∈ Q)(r > 0 ⊃ (∃m ∈ N)(∀n ∈ N)
(|am+n − am| ≤ r)).
4.12. A reflection principle for type theory: the first universe. In
the foregoing we have introduced a set theory in which new sets are
constructed starting form the sets N of natural numbers and Nk of
finite sets, by successively applying the type constructors I, Σ, Π
etc.. This process gives rise to a finite type structure. The theory
so obtained is often indicated by ML or ML0.
We now extend this structure to the infinite. One way of achiev-
ing this is by thinking of the collection of all the sets built until now
as forming a new object of the extended theory. This is suggestively
named universe and indicated by U. Intuitively, the idea is that the
universe is a new type of a higher level which contains as element a
code for each set of the previous level. We observe that in order to
avoid paradoxical situations, the universe can not be considered to
be a set in the sense until now presented; that is, it can not be taken
to belong to the same level as the sets whose codes it contains. It
will be called a type or a ‘large set’, while the elements of the uni-
verse will now be called ‘small sets’. The resulting new theory is
usually indicated by ML1.
There are two distinct ways of presenting the universe. In a
more informal treatment, named by Martin–Lo¨f a` la Russell due
to similarities with ramified type theory, the universe contains as
elements the sets until now introduced. In the second, more precise
and preferable presentation, the universe contains codes for the sets.
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It is therefore introduced together with a decoding function which
assigns sets to codes in the universe. This second presentation is
named a` la Tarski, as the decoding function has similarities with
Tarski’s truth predicate.
From a logical point of view, the closure under the universe of
sets may be seen as a reflection principle, that is as a principle which
allows us to treat propositions of the theory as first class objects.
Note that the universe may be expressed without introducing
an elimination rule, thus leaving its concept ‘open’. An elimination
rule in the form of a structural induction principle would indeed
have the effect of fixing once and for all the basic types and also the
constructors which are allowed in forming new sets from given ones.
In the present case we do not need an elimination rule so that we
formulate U without specifying its corresponding elimination.
As we shall see in the second part, a universe reflecting propo-
sitions is needed for the interpretation of CZF in type theory.
We now recall the rules for the universe ‘Tarski style’. In the
rules we shall make use of a decoding function T as well as constants
Πˆ, Σˆ etc. which represent codes for the corresponding operators.
• U - Formation
U set A ∈ U
TA set

















A ∈ U B ∈ U
A+ˆB ∈ U
A ∈ U B ∈ U
T(A+ˆB) = TA+TB
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A ∈ U x, y ∈ TA
Iˆ(A, x, y) ∈ U
A ∈ U x, y ∈ TA
T(Iˆ(A, x, y)) = I(TA, x, y)
Nˆ0 ∈ U Nˆ1 ∈ U . . . TNˆ0 = N0 TNˆ1 = N1
Nˆ ∈ U TNˆ = N
Once the universe has been introduced type theory can express
constructs of a higher level.
An interesting exercise is to show that the fourth Peano ax-
iom, which is not derivable in type theory without universes, is now
derivable in ML1 (see [27]).
4.13. The hierarchy of universes. We may repeat the operation of
construction of the universe and build a new universe of a higher
level. The new universe may be thought of as containing not only
codes for the small sets but also a code for the first universe. This
will now constitute a stronger reflection principle. This same proce-
dure may be iterated further on, to obtain a hierarchy of universes:
U1,U2,U3, . . . , each containing a copy of the basic sets as well as
copies of all previous universes. Clearly we can not postulate a uni-
verse containing itself as an element, as this would produce a form of
paradox. On the contrary each time we construct a new universe we
need to make sure we ‘go up one level’ with respect to its elements.
We shall see in the second part how the first universe is utilised
to construct on top of it a new large type which represents within
type theory the iterative universe of sets of constructive Zermelo–
Fraenkel set theory. The new type is a particular instance of appli-
cation of a general construct for inductive types, called W, which
we shall now present.
4.14. Inductive types or wellorderings. The type constructorW has
rather complex rules, and might considerably increase the expres-
siveness as well as the strength of a theory when it is added to it.
It provides means for expressing inductive definitions and inductive
data types in constructive type theory.
In order to intuitively understand the action of this type con-
structor, we now consider a particular case of it, which arises by
applying the constructor to the three elements set N3. This gives
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a representation of the second number class (that is the class of
countable ordinals).
Let us see how the second number class could be defined in the
context of type theory. After the rules for W are introduced, it
should become clear how to rephrase the following rules in terms of
W and N3.
We need first of all to introduce a set, O, and its canonical
elements. These can be defined as follows:
(i) 0 is in O;
(ii) if α is in O, then its successor α′ is in O;
(iii) for a sequence of ordinals α0, α1, . . . in O, we can form a
new ordinal supn(αn), intuitively representing the least ordinal
greater than each element in the sequence.
The elimination rule for the set O will then be a rule expressing
transfinite induction over the set.
• O - Formation
O set
• O - Introduction
0 ∈ O α ∈ O
α′ ∈ O
f ∈ N→ O
sup f ∈ O
• O - Elimination
c ∈ O d ∈ C(0)
(x ∈ O, y ∈ C(x))
e(x, y) ∈ C(x′)
(z ∈ N→ O,
w ∈ Π(N, (n).C(Ap(z, n))))
f(z, w) ∈ C(sup(z))
RO(c, d, e, f) ∈ C(c)
We can now generalise this construction to the case of an
arbitrary set A and a family B of sets depending from A as
follows.
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• W - Introduction
a ∈ A b ∈ B(a)→W(A,B)
sup(a, b) ∈W(A,B)
• W - Elimination
c ∈W(A,B)
(x ∈ A, y ∈ B(x)→W(A,B),
z ∈ Π(B(x), (v).C(Ap(y, v))))
d(x, y, z) ∈ C(sup(x, y))
RW(c, d) ∈ C(c)
In the second part we shall see how to use the type constructor
W to build a type which represents within type theory the universe
of sets described by constructive axiomatic set theories like CZF.
This will be a restricted form of W type, mainly W(U,T). We
shall first of all introduce the system CZF and then present the
basic tools for its interpretation in type theory. By means of the
interpretation the relationship between the two notions of sets will
become clear.
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